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The 4M Way of Combating Violent Extremism: An Analysis* 
 
Kumar Ramakrishna 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 
 
This article puts forth a “4M Way” of dealing with the threat of violent Islamist extremism in 
Southeast Asia. It argues that our narrative must be fundamentally more attractive to the target 
audience than the competing vision of the violent extremists. The memes that constitute our 
narrative in the social media space must be “stickier” than those of the violent extremists. The 
personal credibility of our messenger in the eyes of the target audience should exceed that of 
extremist ideologues vis-á-vis that same audience. The mechanisms that we employ to impart our 
messages to the target audience must be more effective that those employed by the violent 
extremists. Finally, we must ensure that the market receptivity of the target audience is promoted 
—by coordinating whole-of-government policies such that activities within the counter-narrative 
space are supported and not inadvertently undercut by policy and military missteps in the wider 
operational space.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
On December 29, 2017, a video surfaced on a website known to be associated with the 
notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS, called Khayr Wilayah Media. Eight minutes 
long, the clip—in Arabic and English—features an interview in English with a suicide bomber 
about to embark on a car bomb attack and footage of ISIS attacks in France and Middle Eastern 
conflict zones as well as on festive celebrations in Western capitals such as Sydney and New 
York City. In particular, the video includes a segment in which the known Singaporean ISIS 
militant Megat Shahdan Abdul Samad—who first surfaced on social media in September 2017—
also known by the moniker Abu Uqayl, leads two other Southeast Asian–looking ISIS fighters, 
most likely wanted Malaysian militants, in executing three kneeling Arab-looking prisoners by 
gunshot at close range. Before carrying out the cold-blooded murders, Abu Uqayl addresses the 
camera in English. He urges ISIS supporters to “slay the enemies of Allah wherever you can find 
them,” insisting that “the fighting has just begun” and “we will never stop cutting off the heads 
of every kuffar and murtadin until we cleanse the land of Islam from East Asia to the West of 
Africa.” The shocking video clip garnered massive attention on social media, prompting the 
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore to roundly condemn it and charging that it represents a 
“desperate attack” by ISIS to drive a wedge between Muslim and non-Muslim Singaporeans. As 
the Singaporean terrorism analyst Bilveer Singh points out, the video clip “reinforces the need to 
be vigilant as the Islamic State remains an existential threat.” He calls it “a daring challenge to 
states,” adding that “it is up to Southeast Asian governments to respond to ensure that the 
terrorists do not succeed even once.”1 
 
Kumar Ramakrishna is an associate professor, head of Policy Studies, and head of the National Security Studies 
Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 
From a presentation given in September 2018 at a conference of the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict 
in Oxford, England, and originally published in slightly different form in Learning from Violent Extremist Attacks: 
Behavioural Sciences Insights for Practitioners and Policymakers, ed. Majeed Khader, Neo Loo Seng, Jethro Tan, 
Damien D. Cheong, and Jeffery Chin (Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2019), 163–174. 
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The Five Key Challenges in the Counter-narrative Policy Space 
This brings us to the five key challenges that practitioners and policymakers need to address in 
dealing with the ongoing and rapidly evolving threat of violent Islamist extremism of the type 
that animates ISIS and its ideological bedfellows in Southeast Asia and elsewhere: 
• Our overall strategic objective must be to ensure that our narrative is 
fundamentally more attractive to the target audience than the competing vision of 
the violent extremists. 
• The memes that constitute our narrative in the social media space or elsewhere 
must be “stickier” than those of the violent extremists. 
• The personal credibility of our messenger in the eyes of the target audience 
should exceed that of extremist ideologues vis-á-vis that same audience.  
• The mechanisms that we employ to impart our messages to the target audience 
must be more effective that those employed by the violent extremists. 
• Policymakers need to ensure that the market receptivity of the target audience is 
promoted, by coordinating whole-of-government policies such that activities 
within the counter-narrative space are supported and not inadvertently undercut 
by policy and military missteps in the wider operational space.  
To meet these five challenges, this article proposes the adoption of what may be called the “4M” 
strategy for countering violent extremism of the type that animates ISIS and its affiliates. This 
strategy is teased out as part of the five responses described in the sections that follow. 
 
Response One: The Strategic Objective—The Need for Memes That Are 
“Stickier” Than Those of the ISIS Extremists 
During the 2017 presidential hustings in Singapore, President Halimah Yacob attracted much 
attention with an arresting slogan for her campaign: “Do good, do together.” Responding to 
public criticism of the technically ungrammatical phrasing, she explained that she chose the 
phrase because “it’s catchy, it’s easy to understand, easy for everyone to relate.”2 She was spot 
on and made a profound point about slogans in general that have wider implications. At one 
level, the advertising world has long understood the principle that the best slogans, or to use the 
more technical term—memes—need not be grammatically correct, just memorable. Malcolm 
Gladwell, author of the classic study The Tipping Point, recounts that in 1954, when the 
American tobacco company Winston introduced filter-tip cigarettes, it marketed them with the 
ungrammatical slogan “Winston tastes good like a cigarette should,” rather than “Winston tastes 
good as a cigarette should.” He notes that within months, “on the strength of that catchy phrase,” 
Winston outsold its major rivals and became the top cigarette brand in the country. Thus, an 
effective meme must be colloquial and memorable to work—not necessarily grammatical.3 
This point bears further analysis. In our modern, Internet-saturated world, there is a surfeit 
of news—true and “fake”—competing for our attention through multiple channels: no longer just 
television, radio, and print but increasingly online by way of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
Whatsapp, Telegram, and a myriad other social media applications on our increasingly 
inexpensive and permanently wired-up smartphones and laptops. Gladwell thus argues that 
whatever we are urged “to read and watch, we simply don’t remember.” This is why modern 
actors—whether advertisers, political parties, governments, and even terrorist and insurgent 
groups—must fight hard to achieve information dominance over a target audience. Only through 
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such control can the actor attain the goal of all such quests: capturing the hearts and minds of the 
constituency in question. Thus, the various memes that constitute a wider overall narrative must 
be “catchy, easy to understand, easy for everyone to relate.” It is suggested here that “Four Ms” 
help us grasp how an actor can employ such memes and the wider narratives they constitute to 
attain the information dominance needed to decisively shape the hearts and minds of a target 
audience: the message, the messenger, the mechanism, and market receptivity. The Four Ms are 
certainly relevant to the domain of countering violent extremism (CVE). 
 
Response Two: The Message 
The first element of the 4M strategy is that the essential message encoded in the meme and wider 
narrative must be “sticky.” That it is, it should be simple to grasp, attention-grabbing, and 
memorable or, as Gladwell puts it, the “presentation and structuring of information” can “make a 
big difference in how much of an impact” is made.4 Chip and Dan Heath have identified several 
factors that make a message and its constituent memes sticky: First, simplicity—the content of 
the message must be simple but profound so that it can be easily recalled.5 Think of the Nike 
meme “Just Do It,” for example. Second, unexpectedness—the message must contain 
counterintuitive elements that snare attention. “Naturally sticky ideas,” the Heaths observe, are 
also “full of concrete images—ice-filled bathtubs, apples with razors—because our brains are 
wired to remember concrete data.” Fourth, credibility—“sticky ideas,” the authors aver, need to 
seem culturally authentic and believable to the target audience. Fifth, emotions—the message 
must appeal viscerally to the audience. In this respect, the Indonesian CVE activist and 
researcher Noor Huda Ismail’s documentaries that explore the impact of violent extremist 
ideology on families that have been involved in the ISIS conflict in Syria are powerful because 
they show the emotional cost of engagement with such extremist causes.6 Sixth and finally, 
stories: the Heaths argue that target audiences are better able to recall messages embedded in 
memorable stories.  
To be sure, there are many moderate Muslim clerics in Southeast Asia who are capable of 
spinning sticky messages that may be capable of competing effectively against the violent 
ideological appeals of ISIS extremists. In village communities in West Java, for example, some 
preachers are popular because their sticky messages, rather than engaging with cumbersome, 
“broader social questions,” focus on “allegories and narrative accounts created out of daily 
experience.” One observer recounts in this regard the impact of an itinerant cleric, “Kiai Al-
Jauhari”: 
I have often seen audiences transfixed by Al-Jauhari’s allegories and narrative accounts. 
He transforms Islamic messages into narrations made up of highly recognizable material, 
with no shortage of humour added to the mix. People are engrossed as he unfolds his 
creations. I have frequently asked village and mosque officials why they engage Al-
                                                          
This section is adapted from Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the 
Manichean Mindset (Singapore: Springer, 2015), 228–229. The 4M Way seeks to improve upon and refine the 
author’s earlier Counter-Ideological Response (CIR) Model, discussed in idem, “Towards a Comprehensive 
Approach to Combating Violent Extremist Ideology in the Digital Space: The Counter-Ideological Response (CIR) 
Model,” in Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Digital Era, ed. Majeed Khader, Loo Seng Neo, 
Gabriel Ong, Eunice Tan Mingyi, and Jeffery Chin (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2016), 260–282. 
 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
 4 
Jauhari. . . . The most common answer is that he is able to hold people’s attention for 
long periods of time. (emphasis mine)7 
It may be argued further that in the age of the social media sound bite, it would be important for 
attractive speakers like Kiai Al-Jauhari to be able to translate their entertaining homilies into 
forms that would become readily digestible “snackable content” for busy, “bored at work” 
consumers who prefer material that is “fast and fun, geared to spread via Facebook.”8 In short, 
the intrinsic attractiveness of the message sticks in the minds of the audience long after the 
messenger leaves. 
 
Response Three: The Messenger 
The messenger that purveys the message is also important. He or she must enjoy significant 
personal credibility with the target audience. This commodity, the leading Allied propagandist in 
World War Two and future Labor government minister in the 1960s Richard H. S. Crossman 
observed, is all-important.9 Selecting credible interlocutors is very audience-specific, moreover. 
Some Southeast Asian counterterrorism officials, for instance, concede that globally famous 
progressive Muslim scholars are often dismissed by violent Islamist militants as working for the 
government. Thus, while such scholars may be effective in communicating with the wider 
community, former radicals may have relatively greater traction with the militant constituency. 
For instance, in Malaysia, the former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) financier Wan Min Wan Mat has 
proven to be an effective interlocutor in the wider counterextremism efforts of the Police Special 
Branch. He and Nasir Abbas, the former JI senior operational leader in Indonesia, have played 
similar roles.10 This is not a new idea either. During the 1950s, at the height of the British 
colonial counterinsurgency campaign against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), while 
Government Information Services churned out publicity material to educate the public, 
surrendered Chinese guerrillas were often employed as well to reach out to their former 
comrades in the Malayan jungles to entice them to surrender, with considerable success. A good 
example of this approach was the use made of the former CPM leader Lam Swee. His 
Government Information Services booklet My Accusation provided an insider’s account of the 
contradictions between CPM rhetoric and the harsh reality on the ground, causing much havoc 
within Communist ranks.11 For current CVE efforts, therefore, it would appear that a judicious 
mix of moderate religious scholars and carefully selected former radicals may be needed. The 
messenger conveying the meme, in short, matters too. 
 
Response Four: The Mechanism 
The relative merits of CVE communication platforms such as the face-to-face, print, broadcast, 
and online media have received scrutiny. Many views abound. For instance, in Indonesia, 
Twitter has been exploited by “Net-savvy radicals” to “lobby for their causes.”12 The Jemaah 
Ansharut Tauhid network, implicated in terrorism-related cases in the country, has also used 
various “internet and social networking sites” and YouTube to put out content.13 More than a 
quarter of the Indonesia’s 240 million people are on Facebook, “thanks in large part to cheap and 
fast Internet-capable phones,” and young people are, unsurprisingly, being targeted for terrorist 
recruitment through social media.14 The current Indonesian police chief, General Tito Karnavian, 
has iterated that in his view, face-to-face contact is more important than the Internet in 
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socializing individuals into violent Islamist ideology and that the “final touch is the personal 
touch.”15 The respected terrorism analyst Sidney Jones of the Institute of Policy Analysis of 
Conflict in Jakarta agrees, pointing out that “although terrorists groups’ Internet use is growing, 
they still do most of their recruiting face-to-face at traditional places such as prayer meetings.”16 
Additionally, print media such as the 137-page comic I Found the Meaning of Jihad, chronicling 
the well-known life story of Nasir Abbas,17 and well-received locally produced documentaries 
such as Prison and Paradise—about the children of the JI perpetrators of the October 2002 Bali 
bombings as well as their victims—have also proven to be quite impactful.18  
Comparatively little attention, however, has been placed on the underlying principles that 
should guide their employment. Two principles from the comparatively sophisticated and 
successful British psychological warfare effort in World War Two stand out in this regard. First, 
the art of propaganda is to conceal that you are actually engaging in it.19 Thus, whether one is 
using online or offline communications platforms, one’s narrative must not come across to the 
audience so blatantly as “propaganda.” National campaigns calling on the public to stand firm 
against violent extremism are needed but the same memes should also be conveyed by “softer,” 
indirect, nongovernmental means, such as blogs, podcasts, commentary, and talk shows 
involving famous sports, media, and entertainment personalities. A second principle is captured 
in the saying “Entertainment is a valuable narcotic for dulling the sensibilities of a propaganda-
conscious mind.”20 The British in 1950s Malaya understood this principle when they invested in 
a strong Malayan Film Unit and Radio Malaya’s Community Listening Service featuring the 
legendary Lee Dai Soh to enthrall rural and urban audiences with anti-Communist memes 
integrated with music, drama, humorous sketches, and short films about the new lives of 
reformed guerillas.21 It is thus telling that modern CVE analysts such as the Dutch-Somali 
commentator Ayaan Hirsi Ali similarly call for the use of humor and satire to undercut violent 
extremist appeals today.22 The satirical and funny British film Four Lions is one example of the 
use of entertainment as a way to promote the anti-extremist meme among vulnerable but wary 
audiences.23  
 
Response Five: Market Receptivity 
The effective absorption by an audience of memes and narratives is also influenced by situational 
context: put another way, are the “consumers” in the target market receptive to your “products”? 
In September 1949, British High Commissioner Henry Gurney’s amnesty for Malayan 
Communists failed. But by August 1957, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Merdeka 
Amnesty succeeded spectacularly in collapsing the CPM’s morale. Why? One of the key factors 
was that in 1949 the public knew the government was not winning, but by Tunku’s time, it was 
patently obvious that the Communists were utterly on the back foot. In other words, by late 1957, 
the “market” in question: the demoralized, rapidly dwindling numbers of Communist guerrillas 
in the Malayan jungle, starved of food and medicines and severely harassed by the Security 
Forces, were ready to lay down arms and were actively looking for a way out.24 Similarly, in 
today’s CVE context, as long as the objective political and socioeconomic grievances that 
underpin Muslim separatism in the southern Philippines continue to be relatively unaddressed, 
we shall likely see more sieges like the standoff between ISIS-linked militants and the 
Philippines military in Marawi City in Mindanao that lasted for five months from May to 
October 2017 and resulted in the killing of more than a thousand people.25 It has long been 
recognized that in the Mindanao context, sheer military force is not enough to resolve the issue 
of violent extremist ideology. Instead, “poverty, illiteracy, bad governance, wide availability of 
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loose firearms, and non-enforcement of the rule of law in southern Philippines created a fertile 
ground for radicalization to take root.”26 In this respect, there is a consensus that the proposed 
Bangsamoro Basic Law, “which provides a regional governance system [and] addresses both 
major political and economic redistribution issues, and important religious and cultural identity 
needs and grievances of contemporary Moros,” represents an “important step in insuring” the 
Philippines against “the threat of ISIS.”27 Failure to deal with such underlying problems would 
only “fuel the recruitment drives” of pro-ISIS militant groups in Mindanao.28 In terms of our 
analysis in this article, the Marawi episode suggests that no number of counterextremist memes 
and narratives is likely to resolve the situation in and of themselves. Memes and the wider 
narratives they constitute are not magic bullets—they can work only if the “market” is receptive. 
 
Conclusion 
The Marawi example also reinforces the point that Southeast Asia, including Singapore today, is 
being assailed by a concerted ISIS social media onslaught seeking to split our respective 
multicultural social fabrics apart. This point is clearly driven home by the December 2017 Abu 
Uqayl video mentioned at the start of this article. Thus, preserving national unity in globalized, 
multicultural, multireligious Singapore in an increasingly inclement strategic environment—
witness the SG Secure meme “Not if, but When”—should be a no-brainer.29 Now more than 
ever, therefore, positive national narratives and their constituent memes—no matter how 
ungrammatical as long as they are sticky, remember—are very much needed to maintain social 
and psychological resilience. Countering the violent extremist threat posed by ISIS and its 
affiliates requires nothing less. 
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